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1Real Potential 
Jennifer McKitrick 
Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
email: jmckitrick2@unl.edu    
There’s a student in my philosophy class who has “real potential.” I 
might express this thought in any of the following ways: “She is po-
tentially a philosopher”; “She is a potential philosopher”; “She has the 
potential to be a philosopher.” The first way uses a cognate of “poten-
tial” as an adverb to modify “is.” The second ways uses “potential” 
as an adjective to modify “philosopher.” However, the third way uses 
“potential” as a noun to refer to something that the student has. What 
kind of thing is this potential? One worry about even asking this ques-
tion is that this nominalization of the adjective “potential” suggests a 
metaphysical picture that is an artifact of language. This is even more 
strongly suggested by the less ambiguous nominalization “potential-
ity.” Once we have the term “potentiality,” we have a new kind of en-
tity to countenance, and questions about its nature arise. One might 
argue, just because we use the word “potentiality,” we should not think 
that it refers to a “thing” that someone can “have.” 
There is something disingenuous about such an argument. It pro-
ceeds as if the adverbial and adjectival uses of “potential” are unprob-
lematic, and questions only arise with the nominalization. But it is not 
obvious what it means to potentially be something, or what it means 
to be a potential something. To say that someone “is potentially” a 
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philosopher is to talk about a way of being that falls short of actu-
ality.1 And a “potential philosopher” is not a kind of philosopher at 
all. So what is it? Each of the three above formulations is a modal 
claim. If there is anything philosophical puzzling about a potential-
ity claim, it is not going to go away by translating it into an equiva-
lent modal claim. 
In this chapter I defend the existence of potentialities against 
anti-realist arguments, and make a proposal as to their nature.2 The 
proposal, in short, is that potentialities are properties, specifically 
dispositions, though more needs to be said about properties and dis-
positions. I will do this in Part I. In Part II, I will address two lines 
of argument against potentialities: that they are reducible, and that 
they are causally inert. 
1. Properties, Dispositions, and Potentialities 
1.1 Properties 
Properties are ascribed to things by predicates, such as “is red.” We 
need not assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
properties and predicates. There can be some predicates that have no 
corresponding property, like “being non-self-instantiating,” and there 
are most likely properties that do not have any corresponding predi-
cate, if there are undiscovered properties that we have no terms for. I 
will consider three competing metaphysical views of properties: sets 
of possibilia (Lewis 1983), universals (Armstrong 1978), and sets of 
tropes (Williams 1953). 
One approach to thinking about properties is to start with particu-
lar things—the things that have the properties. We often group things 
according to their shared properties. So, one way to think about prop-
erties is in terms of these groupings. I call this an extensional ap-
proach to properties since properties are identified with a set of par-
ticulars, or an extension. For example, redness is the set of red things. 
1. This is not to say that a potentiality statement cannot be accounted for in terms of the ac-
tual: however. such statements would require some analysis along the lines of other “mere” 
possibility statements.  
2. Some of these ideas are discussed in my “Dispositions and Potentialities” (2014). 
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However, since sets are individuated by their members, formulating 
the view this way has the implication that redness would be a different 
property if there were different particular red things. But that seems 
wrong. So, if redness is a set, it is better to think of it as the set of all 
the possible red things. This is essentially what David Lewis does. 
According to Lewis, a property is any class or set of actual or pos-
sible entities. One property consists of all the red things in the actual 
world, and all the possible red things in all of the possible worlds. An-
other property consists of my pencil, Bill Clinton, and some possible 
apple in some possible world. On this view, properties are extremely 
abundant, and there need not be any similarity among their members. 
However, for any class of entities, there is just one property; triangu-
larity and trilaterality tum out of be the same property on this view. 
So, this account is inclusive, but also coarse-grained. Entities can be 
grouped in a large variety of ways. Some of these classes will be arbi-
trary groupings. Other classes will group entities that are similar in 
some natural respect. Given the abundance of sets of possibilia, the 
majority of properties will consist of random, miscellaneous things, 
and the classes with members that are naturally similar will be an elite 
minority. Classes of similar entities are importantly different from 
classes of dissimilar entities, and so there needs to be a way to dis-
tinguish these different types of properties. Lewis takes the predicate 
“— is a natural c1ass” to be primitive, and applicable to some proper-
ties, such as the class of red things, but not to others. Implicit in this 
view is a notion of natural kinds; natural properties correspond to 
real distinctions in nature. Arbitrary groupings of dissimilar entities, 
such as the set {my pencil, Bill Clinton, a non-actual apple} are non-
natural, disjunctive properties. Between these two extremes, Lewis 
allows that naturalness can be a matter of degree. For instance, the 
property of ‘being blue or green’ seems more natural than the prop-
erty of ‘being blue or square’. 
While David Armstrong presents a competing account of properties, 
he can agree with Lewis that there are a great many classes of entities, 
and that some of these classes are special in that their members are 
similar to one another. But Armstrong does not call such classes “prop-
erties.” He would say that members of natural classes literally “have 
something in common”-they each instantiate the same universal. Arm-
strong reserves the expression “property” for these universals. Just as 
Lewis’ “natural properties” correspond to natural kinds, Armstrong’s 
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universals correspond to the true natural kinds that would be dis-
covered by a perfect science. Since these are an elite minority, Arm-
strong’s minimalist view is that properties are sparse. Many of our 
predicates do not correspond to real properties. A substantial differ-
ence between Lewis and Armstrong is how to characterize this elite 
set of classes of entities. According to Lewis, we can characterize the 
“elite” classes via the primitive predicate “-is a natural class.” Accord-
ing to Armstrong, in order to characterize this set we need to bring 
in the notion of universals. A third view of properties is that they are 
sets of tropes (Williams 1953). In the language of universals and ex-
tensional theories described above, a trope is a particular instance of 
a property, or the aspect of a particular in virtue of which it is sim-
ilar to other things in the same natural class. The page that you are 
reading right now is white (I suppose). That is a property its shares 
with every other page in this chapter. However, we can refer to this 
page’s whiteness, as distinct from the next page’s whiteness, as the 
white “trope” that this page has. The whiteness that is common to all 
the pages in the chapter is a set of white tropes. As with Lewis’ view, 
certain sets of tropes are special because they have some irreducible 
similarity relation to one another. Some versions of trope theory call 
these sets “properties.” 
1.1.1 Second-Order Properties 
In addition to natural properties, another type of property that is im-
portant to this discussion is that of a second-order property. A sec-
ond-order property is the property of having some property or other 
which meets some specification. The having of a first-order property, 
by contrast, does not necessarily involve the having of another prop-
erty. For example, suppose that color properties, such as ‘being red,’ or 
‘being blue,’ are first-order properties. A second-order property, then, 
would be ‘being colored’-a property that a thing has just in case it has 
some color property or other. ‘Being red’ or ‘being blue’ are different 
ways of ‘being colored.’ In other words, ‘being red’ and ‘being blue’ 
are determinates of the determinable ‘being colored.’ Determinables 
are a kind of second-order property (Yablo 1992; Funkhauser 2006), a 
property that a thing has in virtue of having anyone among a number 
of more specific, determinate properties. If having a potentiality is a 
J.  McKitr ick  in  Handbo ok  of  P otential ity  (2018)       5
matter of having certain other properties, then potentialities would be 
second-order properties, and their ontological status would be linked 
to that of second-order properties. 
A so-called second-order property might actually be third-order, 
or higher-order. Perhaps a color property such as ‘being green’ is not 
a first-order property at all, but a property that an object has just in 
case it has some surface-reflectance property or other. Then, the prop-
erty of being colored would be a third (or higher) order property, that 
is, the property of having some property. To avoid making assump-
tions about the basicness of any particular property, the expressions 
“first-order property” and “second-order property” can be thought 
of as relative terms. Some potentialities are likely to be higher-order 
properties. For example, if the potential to be a philosopher is a mat-
ter of having other properties such as intelligence and inquisitive-
ness, but these properties are also possessed in virtue of possessing 
other properties, then the potential to be a philosopher would be at 
least third-order. 
Armstrong uses the expression “second-order properties” in a dif-
ferent sense, to refer to properties which properties have. On the uni-
versals account of properties, universals can have things in common. 
For instance, some universals are relations. So, ‘being a relation’ is 
a property that properties can have. These are what Armstrong calls 
“second-order properties.” Note that this is different from a property 
that a particular has in virtue of having another property. (While a 
thing has the second-order property ‘being colored’ in virtue of being 
red, in Armstrong’s terminology, one might say that redness is a first-
order property that has the second-order property of being a color.) 
On a sparse universals theory such as Armstrong’s, the reality of sec-
ond-order properties of particulars is called into question. If univer-
sals are sparse, we need not posit universals that things have in virtue 
of having other universals. It would not be in keeping with a mini-
malist account to say that a red thing instantiates universals for be-
ing colored, being red, being a certain shade of red, in addition to be-
ing a certain surface reflectance. There might be just one universal 
that makes all of these predications true—they might all have the same 
“truth-maker.” A thing’s so-called “first-order” property might be the 
only truth-maker we need for all of our predications of it. 
According to trope theory, second-order properties would be sets 
of tropes. So “being colored” would be the set of all the sets of color 
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tropes. A particular trope would be a color trope in virtue of being 
a red trope, say. That seems to cash out a sense in which something 
could have a second-order property, being colored, in virtue of hav-
ing a first-order property like being red. 
On an extensional account of properties, a given property is not 
essentially first, second, or higher order. “Being red, orange, yellow, 
green, blue, indigo, or violet” seems like a disjunctive first-order prop-
erty. However, if it has the same extension as the apparently second-
order property “having some color property or other,” then it is the 
same property. Likewise, “the property of having property P” would 
seem to be a second-order property. However, it would necessarily 
have the same extension as property P, an apparently first-order prop-
erty. So “P” and “the property of having P” are but two names for the 
same property. On this account, it seems that the “order” of the prop-
erty is a function of the way it is characterized, rather than something 
about the nature of the property itself. Therefore, it makes more sense 
to talk about first and second-order characterizations of properties for 
an extensional account. However, one can still do some justice to the 
idea of a second-order property by talking about properties whose ca-
nonical characterization is second-order. This might be the case if the 
most salient point of resemblance between members of a class is the 
possession of various properties which meet a certain specification. 
1.1.2 Real Properties 
Now that the major metaphysical views about properties are on the 
table, we can return to questions of existence and reality. What does 
it mean for a property to exist, or to be real? According to Armstrong, 
it is a matter of the existence of a universal. But how do we know 
which universals exist? Armstrong accepts an instantiation condition, 
so a universal does not exist unless some actual particular instanti-
ates that property. But that does not settle the matter, for it is not ob-
vious which properties are instantiated. A number of things may ap-
pear to be jade, but are not instantiating the same universal if some 
of them are nephrite and others of them are jadeite. The real prop-
erties of things are the subject of scientific investigation, not some-
thing we can discern from ordinary predicates and folk-descriptions 
of things. A consequence of this view is that many of our predicates 
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do not correspond to real properties. Given the underlying differences 
in things that appear to be the same shade of red, it is unlikely that 
“red,” let alone “the potential to be a philosopher,” picks out a genuine 
property. However, if there are any fundamental physical potentiali-
ties, like electric charge for instance, then a universals account could 
allow that such potentialities exist. 
On trope theory, a property exists whenever you have a set of sim-
ilar tropes. Since a set can be a singleton, the existence of any trope 
entails the existence of a property. However, trope theory as such does 
not indicate which tropes exist. If a predicate is aptly applied to some-
thing, there is nothing about trope theory per se to tell us there is no 
corresponding property. Of course, one could have a minimalist trope 
theory, akin to a minimalist universals theory. But if it is true that one 
way for something to be is for it to have the potential to be something 
else, then a potentiality trope, and a potentiality, exist. 
Lewis’ extensional theory of properties is the most liberal with re-
spect to property existence. On this view, for any set of possible things, 
there is a property. Furthermore, the things need not actually exist 
(in this world). This view has no   effective instantiation condition, 
which enables us to talk about properties that nothing actually has. 
The only “properties” that do not exist are sets that have no possible 
members. The potentiality to be a philosopher is a property because 
it is possible that there are some people who could be philosophers in 
the future. Since properties are so easy to come by on an extensional 
account, perhaps when one asks “are potentialities real?” she is re-
ally interested in whether potentialities are “natural,” and whether 
any of their instances (members) exist in the actual world. The ques-
tion becomes: Do any actual things have potentialities, and if so, do 
they share a certain natural respect of similarity? The answer to that 
might depend on not only on the nature of potentiality and the par-
ticular potentiality in question, but also on one’s understanding of 
what it means to be natural. If being natural is a matter of degree, 
the equation of “natural” with “real” has the odd implication that re-
ality comes in degrees. 
To summarize, none of the three metaphysical views about proper-
ties considered rule out the existence of potentialities. On Armstrong’s 
theory of universals, potentialities, like other properties, would be 
sparse at best. Trope theory would offer the less-than-helpful sugges-
tion that there are potentialities if there are potentiality tropes. On 
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Lewis’ extensional view, potentialities, like other properties, would be 
abundant, though not necessarily natural. So, anti-realism about po-
tentialities does not follow from major approaches to the metaphysics 
of properties. But before I examine more targeted arguments against 
potentialities, I need to say more about them. But since I am giving a 
dispositional account of potentialities, I need to say more about dis-
positions first. 
1.2 Dispositions 
When someone has a disposition, he or she is prone to act in certain 
ways in certain circumstances. A cowardly person is disposed to flee 
from danger, for example. A sociable person is disposed to seek the 
company of others. Physical objects can also have dispositions. Frag-
ile objects are disposed to break when struck. Elastic objects are dis-
posed to stretch when pulled. As with ordinary language, science, too, 
is rife with dispositions talk. A substance is volatile or reactive if it is 
disposed to enter into reactions with other substances. A material is 
conductive if it is disposed to transmit an electric charge. An element 
is unstable if it is disposed to decompose. An organism is fit for a cer-
tain environment if it is disposed to survive in that environment. Nu-
merous synonyms and near-synonyms, such as “power,” “capacity,” 
“tendency,” and “predisposition” expand the range of dispositional lo-
cutions even further. 
It is widely acknowledged that dispositions-talk is ubiquitous. How-
ever, it is a matter of some controversy how this talk is to be under-
stood. On a realist account, a disposition is a property, or a quality 
that things can have, like redness or solidity. A disposition has a char-
acteristic manifestation. For example, the characteristic manifesta-
tion of fragility is shattering, and the characteristic manifestation of 
cowardliness is avoidance of danger. The manifestation need not oc-
cur for the object to have the disposition. A glass can be fragile even 
if it never shatters. A manifestation of a disposition occurs (at least 
typically) when the object with the disposition is subject to certain 
circumstances. The fragile glass shatters when it is struck. The cir-
cumstances in which the manifestation occurs are called “the circum-
stances of manifestation.” They include not only the salient “trigger” 
for the manifestation (the striking), but also the necessary background 
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conditions, such as ambient temperature and gravitational forces. In 
some cases, the manifestation will occur at the location of the dis-
posed object itself. In the case of the fragile glass, the shattering oc-
curs where the glass is. However, in other cases, the “locus of mani-
festation” may be elsewhere. For example, if something is provocative, 
the manifestation will occur in the thing provoked. 
Given that a disposition is associated with a manifestation, and 
with circumstances which trigger the occurrence of this manifesta-
tion, there is a natural association between a statement attributing a 
disposition to a thing and a certain conditional statement: If the con-
ditions were to obtain, the manifestation would occur. For example, 
the statement “This glass is fragile” bears some important relation to 
the statement “If this glass were struck, it would shatter.” An attribu-
tion of a disposition to some object licenses inferences about what will 
happen in various circumstances. These inferences may be defeasible, 
but the ability to make these inferences is what makes dispositions 
talk so useful, if not indispensable. We frequently have pressing rea-
sons to be concerned about predicting what things will do in various 
circumstances. It is important to know what is poisonous and what 
is nutritious, which animals are aggressive, and which situations are 
dangerous. We are interested to predict the behavior of our fellow hu-
man beings, and so describe them as friendly, hostile, irritable, shy, 
ambitious, trust-worthy, and so on. Disposition ascriptions are an im-
portant means of communicating our understanding of what to expect 
from the things in our environment. 
Furthermore, when an object is disposed to behave in a certain way 
in certain circumstances, it is often thought that there is something 
about the object “in virtue of which” this is so. The fragile glass is dis-
posed to shatter when struck due to some feature of the glass. The sil-
icon bonding in the glass is such that, if an excessive strain is placed 
on these bonds due to warpage of the glass, some of the bonds will 
break, starting a chain reaction of bonds breaking. Hence, the glass 
shatters when struck. This type of molecular bonding is the causal ba-
sis of the glass’s fragility. A disposition’s causal basis is a property of 
the disposed object which is causally efficacious for the disposition’s 
manifestation, if and when such manifestation occurs. Dispositions 
and causal bases do not typically have a one-to-one correspondence. 
Crystal wine glasses and egg shells are both fragile, but have very 
different structures and constituents. Presumably, these things have 
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different properties in virtue of which they are prone to break when 
struck. That is to say: the causal basis of fragility in a wine glass is 
a different property than the causal basis of fragility in an egg shell. 
Or consider electrical conductivity and thermal conductivity, two dif-
ferent dispositions which have the same causal basis in metals. Fur-
thermore, there may be ungrounded dispositions that have no causal 
bases at all (McKitrick 2003b). 
1.2.1 Dispositional and Categorical Predicates 
Dispositional predicates are conceptually associated with manifesta-
tions, circumstances, and conditionals. Non-dispositional, or categor-
ical predicates do not have these associations. As paradigm examples 
of categorical predicates, philosophers sometimes offer shape predi-
cates. Arguably, to say something is square is not to say anything about 
what it would do in particular circumstances; ‘being square’ has no 
associated manifestation or triggering event. Arguably, categorical 
predicates do not have the relevant relation to conditionals.3 As Eliz-
abeth Prior notes “dispositional ascription sentences possess a rela-
tionship to certain subjunctive conditionals not possessed by categor-
ical ascription sentences” (Prior 1985, 62). 
Most philosophers acknowledge a distinction between disposi-
tional and categorical predicates. Nevertheless, this characterization 
is rough, the nature of this conceptual association is left vague, and 
how to categorize a given predicate may be a matter of dispute. Ac-
cording to Goodman, for example, “almost every predicate commonly 
thought of as describing a lasting objective characteristic of a thing 
is as much a dispositional predicate as any other” (Goodman 1983: 
41). The predicate “is square” seems categorical, but it is associated 
with certain conditionals, such as “if you try to put it in a round hole, 
it will not fit.” 
Some philosophers claim that the dispositional/categorical dis-
tinction ends there, as merely a distinction among predicates, which 
3. Some argue that all predicates are related to conditionals in the relevant way, undermin-
ing this way of distinguishing categorical from dispositional properties (Mellor 1982). 
One could reply by arguing that dispositional and non-dispositional predicates differ in 
the ways they are related to conditionals. However, I will not pursue such arguments here, 
for the claim that there are some non-dispositional predicates is not central to my main 
thesis that potentialities are dispositions.
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does not correspond to any interesting metaphysical distinction among 
properties. Sidney Shoemaker, for example, says “I think that the term 
‘dispositional’ is best employed as a predicate of predicates, not of 
properties” (1980: 211). According to Shoemaker, what determines the 
identity of a property “is its potential for contributing to the causal 
powers of the things that have it” (1980: 212). Though Shoemaker 
would resist, one might want to describe his view by saying that all 
properties are dispositional properties. At the other extreme, David 
Armstrong claims that all properties are categorical properties (1996: 
16). On Armstrong’s view, these categorical properties stand in Neces-
sitation relations, thereby establishing lawful connections between in-
stantiations of universals, and leaving no role for dispositions. He ac-
knowledges that some properties are picked out by disposition terms, 
but claims that such terms simply provide us with a useful way of 
speaking of categorical properties. As Armstrong puts it, the disposi-
tional/categorical distinction is a “verbal distinction that cuts no on-
tological ice” (1973: 15).   
Clearly, Armstrong thinks that the distinction between proper-
ties makes sense—he just thinks that one of the categories is empty, 
and so if a non-trivial distinction is wanted, then it must apply to 
predicates. Although Shoemaker wants to reserve “dispositional” as 
a predicate of predicates, he can agree with Armstrong that the dis-
tinction between properties makes sense-he just disagrees about 
which category is empty. Questions about whether the world con-
tains dispositions, categorical properties, or both are metaphysical, 
not merely linguistic. Categorical properties, then, are properties 
which do not have the relevant associations with manifestations, cir-
cumstances, and conditionals. Along these lines, Stephen Yablo of-
fers as an intuitive characterization, “a property is categorical just 
in case a thing’s having it is independent of what goes on in non-ac-
tual worlds” (1987: 306).4 
Naturally, there is room for dispute as to which properties are cat-
egorical and which are dispositional. Hugh Mellor argues that even 
shape properties are dispositions. For example, he says that triangu-
larity is the property of being disposed to be counted as three-angled 
(1974: 171). Similarly, Goodman says “a cubical object is one capable of 
fitting try squares and measuring instruments in certain ways” (1983: 
4. Yablo goes on to argue that this characterization is inadequate. 
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41). I am not going to dispute these claims here; I am just trying to 
explain the distinction between dispositional and categorical proper-
ties, without taking a stand as to which (if any) specific properties fall 
into each category, or if the categories are exhaustive. 
1.2.2 Marks of Dispositionality 
To summarize the key points of this section so far, a disposition such 
as fragility can be characterized as follows. A fragile glass will shatter 
if you strike it hard enough. Fragility is the glass’s disposition, shatter-
ing is the manifestation of the disposition, and being struck is the cir-
cumstance of manifestation. The underlying cause of the glass’s shat-
tering constitutes the causal basis of the glass’s fragility. The glass 
can remain fragile even if it never shatters. One can say of the fragile 
glass, with certain qualifications, that if it were struck, it would shat-
ter. This characterization suggests certain “marks of dispositionality,” 
according to which a property is a disposition if it: 
(1) has a characteristic manifestation; 
(2) is such that certain circumstances can trigger that 
manifestation; 
(3) can be possessed without the manifestation occurring; 
(4) is instantiated by things of which a conditional of the form 
“if it were subject to the circumstances, it would exhibit the 
manifestation” is generally true; and 
(5) can be accurately characterized with an expression of the 
form “the disposition to produce the manifestation in the 
circumstances” (McKitrick 2003a). 
I take it that these conditions are jointly sufficient for disposition-
ality, but I am not committed to their being individually necessary. 
The association with conditional statements (my fourth mark) has re-
ceived extensive discussion in the literature. Later, I will discuss nu-
merous counterexamples to conditional analyses of dispositions. These 
counter-examples suggest that analyzing a disposition ascription in 
terms of a conditional statement will always be fraught with difficul-
ties. One may question whether an association with a conditional is a 
mark of dispositionality at all. 
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However, the fourth mark of dispositionality is carefully hedged. 
I claim that if a property is a disposition, then it is instantiated by 
things of which a conditional of the form “if it is subject to the circum-
stances, it exhibits the manifestation” is generally true, allowing for 
exceptions. That is to say, a thing might have the disposition in ques-
tion even if the relevant conditional is not true of it. For example, “if 
you drop it, it will break” is not true of the carefully packed glass, but 
nevertheless, the glass is still fragile. The marks of dispositionality ap-
ply to property types, while typical counter-examples to conditional 
analyses feature particular property tokens or tropes. While there may 
be particular dispositional tropes of which the conditional is not true, 
that does not show that the general property does not bear the marks. 
So, even though a particular glass may have its fragility masked by 
careful packing, the general property ‘fragility’ still: 
(1) has a characteristic manifestation-breaking; 
(2) is such that certain impacts can trigger that 
manifestation-breaking; 
(3) can be possessed without breaking; 
(4) is instantiated by things of which a conditional of the form  
“if it were struck, it would break” is generally true; and 
(5) can be accurately characterized with an expression of the 
form “the disposition to break when struck.” 
If a property was never instantiated by anything of which the rele-
vant conditional were true, that would not be a clear case of disposi-
tional property. But I do not claim that the truth of the conditional is 
necessary or sufficient for a property to be a disposition. 
If a property bears most of the marks, I claim that is some evidence 
that the property in question is a disposition. As an example of a dis-
position that lacks one of the other marks, consider stability, which: 
(1) has a characteristic manifestation-maintaining structural in-
tegrity, or staying intact; 
(2) has circumstances of manifestation-various stresses to this 
structural integrity. (Note that “stability” will always be rela-
tive to certain kinds of stress-stable in wind, stable in earth-
quakes, etc.); 
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(4) is instantiated by things of which a conditional of the form “if 
it were stressed, it would stay intact” is generally true; and 
(5) can be accurately characterized with an expression of the 
form “the disposition to stay intact when stressed.”  
Note that the third mark, the possibility of possession without man-
ifestation, is absent. Stability is a disposition that cannot be possessed 
without being manifest-a structure that is not manifesting stability 
is not stable. Others argue that dispositions like radioactivity mani-
fest spontaneously and thus lack stimulus conditions (Vetter 2010). 
In those cases, the second mark-having circumstances of manifesta-
tion would be absent. 
Perhaps these counterexamples seem to reveal the shortcomings of 
the marks of dispositionality. However, these marks do not constitute 
a decision procedure for determining whether a disposition is instan-
tiated in a particular instance. Instead, their purpose is to help de-
termine whether a general property is dispositional. Here, I use them 
to argue that potentialities are dispositions. Marks of dispositional-
ity provide evidence that a property is a disposition, but do not con-
stitute a reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions. 
1.2.3 Accounts of Dispositions 
Various accounts of dispositions have been offered which are consis-
tent with these marks of dispositionality. On some views, dispositions 
are fundamental, irreducible powers (Molnar 2003). While such pow-
ers cannot be analyzed in terms of anything more basic, proponents 
of such views argue, contrary to Hume, that it is a concept that we ac-
quire by experience, and that we can characterize roughly as outlined 
above. According to other views, to ascribe a dispositional predicate 
to something is tantamount to asserting a certain subjunctive condi-
tional. For example, “x is fragile” is said to be true if and only if a con-
ditional such as “if x were dropped, x would break” is true (Gundersen 
2002; Choi 2006). According to a simple conditional analysis: 
x is disposed to exhibit manifestation M in circumstances C 
iff (if x were in C. x would exhibit M). 
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The idea that dispositions have causal bases suggests a second-or-
der property view of dispositions, according to which having a dispo-
sition is having some property which would be causally efficacious for 
its manifestation. This can be more formally stated as follows: 
x has a disposition D to exhibit M in C iff x has some property 
P which is a causal basis for giving M in C (where property P 
is a causal basis of D iff P is a property of x which would be 
causally efficacious for M in C). (Johnston 1992: 230) 
Lewis’s revised conditional analysis (1997) is also a second-order 
property view. The idea, somewhat simplified, can be put as follows: 
 x has a disposition at time t to give M in C iff x has intrin-
sic property P, and if x were to be in C at time t and retain P, 
then P and C would cause M (1997: 157).  
Manley and Wasserman’s “PROP” offers a conditional analysis, 
which relaxes the stringent requirement that a disposed object must 
manifest its disposition in its circumstances of manifestation, and 
counts an object as having a disposition as long as the disposed ob-
ject manifests often enough. More formally: 
x is disposed to M when C iff x would M in a suitable propor-
tion of C-cases (2008: 76). 
It is not my objective to endorse and defend a particular account 
of dispositions here. I am concerned with these analyses, however, to 
the extent that they challenge a realist dispositional account of po-
tentialities. Accordingly, I will argue against the idea that any of these 
accounts facilitate a reduction or elimination of dispositions or po-
tentialities from our ontology. But first, I will make the case that dis-
positions are potentialities. 
1.3 Potentiality 
I began with the example of my student who has philosophical poten-
tial. Here are a few more examples of potentiality claims: An embryo 
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is a potential person; a patient has the potential to be conscious; a 
caterpillar is potentially a butterfly; an acorn has the potential to be 
an oak tree. In general, when one says “x is potentially F,” “x is a po-
tential F,” or “x has the potentiality to be (an) F,” ‘F’ refers to either a 
property that x can have, or a class or kind of which x can be a mem-
ber: The occurrence or state of affairs, “x being F,” is the actualiza-
tion of x’s potential to be F. One way for a thing to become a member 
of a kind is by acquiring certain properties that are characteristic of 
that kind. In that case, the two ways of being potentially F (where F 
is either a property that one can have or a kind of which one can be 
a member) come to essentially the same thing, slightly complicated 
by the fact that kind membership may require having more than one 
property. 
Another common use of the term “potentiality” that should be 
kept in mind might be called “epistemic potentiality.” When you 
think there is some chance that something has a certain property, 
you might say that it “potentially” has that property. For example, 
suppose your perfectly healthy friend, John, is in the next room and 
you are not sure whether he is asleep or awake. You might express 
you judgment about John by saying “John is potentially conscious.” 
But John is not like the coma patient, whose capacity for future con-
sciousness is in question. So, presumably, you are not making a claim 
that you take for granted, that John, who is now sleeping, has the po-
tential to be conscious in the future. Rather, you are saying that, as 
far as you know, John is conscious right now.
This sense of potentiality would seem to have little to do with the 
relevant potentialities of a student, embryo or patient. However, it 
may be important to keep it in mind, lest we confuse our uncertainty 
as to whether something already has a certain property with the 
judgment that it could possibly acquire that property in the future. 
Perhaps this conflation is going on in Noonan’s “An Almost Absolute 
Value in History,” where he compares aborting a fetus to shooting 
into some bushes where a hunter might be (Noonan 1970). In both 
cases, you could say “there is a potential person there.” However, in 
the case of the hunter, the potentiality is epistemic, whereas in the 
case of the fetus, on the most plausible interpretation of the claim 
“there is a potential person there,” the potentiality is metaphysical, 
not merely epistemic. 
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1.3.1 Potentialities Are Dispositions 
Potentiality claims and disposition claims are importantly similar. To 
talk about what something has the potential or disposition to do is to 
make a claim about a future possibility-the “threats and promises” 
that fill the world (Goodman 1983: 41). Potentiality-talk and dispo-
sitions-talk are often interchangeable. When x is potentially F, one 
can say that x is disposed to be F, where “being F” is the manifesta-
tion of x’s disposition. Disposition ascriptions can likewise be put in 
terms of potentiality: If the bomb is explosive, it has the potential 
to explode; the fragile glass has the potential to break. Shoemaker’s 
classic paper uses the terms “disposition” and “potentiality” inter-
changeably (1980: 213). Granted, potentiality-talk and dispositions-
talk are not perfectly interchangeable. You might say that an oak tree 
is potentially a table, but that it is not disposed to be a table. And you 
might have the potential to be a drug dealer, even if you would not 
say that you are disposed to be a drug dealer.5 Many disposition as-
criptions in ordinary language suggest a stronger tendency, a higher 
probability of the manifestation occurring, than do the analogous po-
tentiality ascriptions. 
However, such observations are consistent with potentialities being 
dispositions nevertheless. The ordinary-language connotation of many 
disposition claims may be that the manifestation has a high probabil-
ity of occurring, but this is defeasible. Some particular instantiations 
of dispositions are unlikely to manifest. For example, a nuclear bomb 
has a disposition to explode, but let us hope that is unlikely to hap-
pen. Furthermore, it is a misnomer to talk of “the” disposition to so-
and-so, for the manifestation alone does not uniquely specify a dispo-
sition. Two different dispositions could have the same manifestation, 
but not be the same disposition. Someone who gets red-faced when-
ever she is complemented is not manifesting the same disposition as 
he whose ruddy complexion reflects his ample consumption of alco-
hol. What differentiates these dispositions is that they have different 
stimuli, or circumstances of manifestation. Granted, there are some 
5. Thanks to the audience at my presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska for these examples. especially Reina Hayaki for suggesting the right 
response. 
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cases where the expressions “the potential to be F” and “the dispo-
sition to be F” pick out different properties. However, even in those 
cases, “the potential to be F” still picks out a disposition, since the ex-
pression “the disposition to be F” is ambiguous. 
Though the imperfect interchangeability of dispositions-talk and 
potentiality-talk is suggestive, a better way to gauge whether poten-
tialities are dispositions is to consider whether they bear the marks of 
dispositionality. Consider an embryo’s potential for rationality: 
(1) It has a manifestation-being rational; 
(2) This manifestation will occur given certain (albeit very 
complicated to specify) circumstances of a favorable 
environment, nurturance, and so on; 
(3) An embryo can possess the potential to be rational without 
being rational; 
(4) A certain conditional is, other things being equal, true of the 
embryo: If a certain favorable environment and nurturance 
were to obtain, the embryo would become rational; and 
(5) It is not inappropriate to call the potential for rationality “the 
disposition to become rational.” 
It is also worth noting that, like many dispositions, potentialities 
often have causal bases. An embryo’s potential to be rational is not 
a brute, fundamental feature, but is presumably based on its genetic 
code and other biological factors. 
Given that potentialities are dispositions, it is not clear whether 
dispositions and potentialities are coextensive, or whether potential-
ities are a subset of dispositions. Perhaps potentialities are a distinc-
tive subset because the locus of manifestation is always where the ob-
ject that had the potentiality is located. Given that the manifestation 
of x’s potential to be F is “x being F,” it may seem as though the man-
ifestation of x’s potentiality must occur where x is. When x manifests 
x’s potential to be rational, “being rational” happens where x is. This 
is not true of dispositions in general. A thing can be disposed to have 
an effect on something else: roses are disposed to smell sweet, pro-
vocative capes make bulls charge, and soporific lullabies put babies 
to sleep. In those cases, the locus of manifestation is not where the 
disposed object is. 
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However, a potentiality’s manifestation is not always a matter of 
the individual who had the potential instantiating a property. One rea-
son for this is because a thing can have the potential to become a dif-
ferent thing, changing its characteristics to such an extent that it is no 
longer the same individual anymore. Of course, whether this happens 
will depend on your views of diachronic identity, or what changes an 
individual can survive over time. Consider the acorn’s potentiality to 
be a tree. The manifestation of that potentiality is something ‘being 
a tree.’ But it is not clear whether the individual that is a tree now is 
numerically identical to the original acorn. Furthermore, you could 
bum the tree, so it has the potentiality to be a pile of ashes. But if that 
happens, arguably you do not end up with something that is at once 
the acorn, the tree, and a pile of ashes. To consider another example, 
when an unfertilized egg realizes its potential to develop into a ratio-
nal being, it is not clear that the original ovum and the rational be-
ing are the same individual. Or consider a case of fission where, for 
example, one plant can have the potential to. become several plants. 
If we divide and root several parts of the original plant, arguably, the 
original plant has ceased to be, and whatever potentialities it had are 
being realized by its descendants.  
A way to deal with these sorts of cases is to say that, when a po-
tentiality to be F is realized, either the individual who had the poten-
tial or its causal descendant is F. To make good on this proposal, one 
would have to cash out the notion of a “causal descendant,” which 
may prove difficult. Surely, one’s children are candidates for being 
one’s causal descendants. But while parents may try to live vicariously 
through their children, your daughter becoming a doctor would not 
realize your potential to be a doctor. Perhaps it is better to relinquish 
the notion that the locus of manifestation for a potentiality is where 
the potentiated individual is, for there are other sorts of counter-ex-
amples to this claim. 
For example, when you realize a potential to do something, such as 
score a goal, the effect that you have does not always happen where 
you are. Also, some people have the potential to be dangerous, funny, 
or annoying, but when someone manifests being dangerous, funny, or 
annoying, it is often someone else that is hurt, laughing. or annoyed. 
Having the potential to instantiate a relational property is a simi-
lar sort of case. Consider the potential to be President of the United 
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States. When that potentiality is actualized, it is the person who had 
the potential that now has the property of being the President of the 
United States.6 However, since having that property depends on com-
plicated historical and social relations that go beyond the bounds of 
the individual, it is not clear that the manifestation is entirely located 
where the individual who had the potential is. 
Another idea about how to distinguish potentialities from other 
dispositions is that potentialities cannot be possessed while mani-
festing. Generally, when a disposition manifests, the disposed object 
might continue to instantiate the disposition, or it might not. Some-
times, a thing loses a disposition when it manifests it, or even ceases 
to exist. The bomb is no longer explosive after it explodes. The match 
is no longer flammable once it has burned. The disposition, in effect, 
gets spent, and is no longer possessed. Elastic bands, on the other 
hand, are still elastic when stretched. Magnets are still magnetic even 
when they are manifesting their magnetism. What about potential-
ities? Does a person have the potential to be a person? Does a living 
thing have the potential for life? Perhaps, when potentialities have 
been and continue to be actualized, it is often no longer appropriate to 
say that they are possessed. However, there are exceptions. Someone 
may have the potential to grow, or to learn, realize those potentiali-
ties, and yet still have the potential to grow or learn. So, it is false to 
say that a potentiality is never both actualized and possessed. Some-
times, saying that an F is potentially F is misleading and inappropri-
ate, but perhaps it is not false. 
In sum, potentialities are dispositions whose manifestation is a 
matter of the disposed individual acquiring a property and/or becom-
ing a member of a kind. Typically, the manifestation occurs where the 
disposed individual is. And perhaps potentialities often cease to be 
instantiated once they are manifest. However, manifestations of dis-
positions also involve things acquiring properties. Furthermore, like 
dispositions, the manifestation of a potentiality can happen either 
where the potentiated object is or elsewhere, and potentialities can 
be possessed while their manifestations are occurring. Consequently, 
potentialities do not seem to have any essential characteristics that 
distinguish them from dispositions. So there is no clear reason to 
6. Thanks to Harry Ide for these examples.
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distinguish them. Lacking any reason to think that potentialities are 
different from dispositions, we can assume that what is true about dis-
positions is true about potentialities, and reasons to think that dispo-
sitions are real are reasons to think that potentialities are real. 
2 Realism Versus Anti-realism About Potentialities 
2.1 Reduction 
We employ numerous and diverse dispositional and potentiality con-
cepts. What does that tell us about the world? I hope it is not too na-
ïve to think that long entrenched traditions of employing certain con-
cepts with apparent success gives some reason to think that those 
concepts are related to the world in meaningful ways. Perhaps, if our 
potentiality ascriptions are true, then the potentialities we ascribe 
to things exist, in whatever sense properties exist. This assumption 
stands in opposition to a notable philosophical project of the last cen-
tury, to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions (Schrenk 2009). 
That reduction can be applied to potentiality claims as well. If the re-
ductionist project is successful, one could say that potentiality ascrip-
tions are true, but not because potentialities exist, but because the as-
criptions are merely ways of asserting something that is consistent 
with the non-existence of potentialities, such as a conditional, or a 
claim about other sorts of entities. Just as the claim that “The average 
American woman has 1.5 children” does not commit one to the exis-
tence of the average American woman nor half-children, one may ar-
gue that truth of claims such as “Alice is a potential philosopher” and 
“an acorn is potentially an oak tree” does not commit one to the ex-
istence of potentialities. 
So, one reason to be anti-realist about potentialities is because you 
think that potentiality claims can be reductively analyzed and elimi-
nated in favor of other sorts of entities. I have suggested that a prima 
facie reason to think that a property exists is that we consistently ap-
ply a certain predicate. But this prima facie reason is defeasible. As 
Shoemaker writes: 
... we have a notion of a property ... which is such that not ev-
ery phrase of the form ‘being so and so’ stands for a property 
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which something has just in case the corresponding predicate 
of the form ‘is so and so’ is true of it, and is such that some-
times a predicate is true of a thing, not because (or only be-
cause) of any properties it has, but because something else, 
perhaps something related to it in certain ways, has certain 
properties (1980: 209). 
The assumption that we are referring to a property can be under-
mined if a reductive analysis of disposition and potentiality claims can 
succeed. As Troy Cross writes: 
if, as it was hoped. subjunctive conditionals could be given 
truth conditions in purely categorical terms, dispositions 
could be eliminated from fundamental ontology and replaced 
with purely categorical properties, or perhaps categorical 
properties together with laws of nature (2012: 115). 
2.1.1 Simple Conditional Analyses 
A common reductive strategy has been to analyze disposition claims 
in terms of conditional statements. For example: 
(A) x is disposed to exhibit manifestation M in circumstance C iff 
(B) if x were to be subject to C, x would exhibit M. 
Similarly for potentialities, the analysis would be: 
(A)P x has the potential to become F in circumstance C iff 
(B)P if x were in C, x would become F. 
(If, as argued above, potentialities and dispositions are co-exten-
sive, these come to the same thing. However, in order to demon-
strate that what is true of disposition claims is also true of potential-
ity claims, I will consider each type of claim in tum.) The reductionist 
would argue that since the analysans in either case do not mention 
dispositions or potentialities, but only particulars, circumstances, and 
properties, as long as we have an account of what it means for the rel-
evant kind of conditional to be true, we have an account of how the 
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disposition or potentiality statement can be true without positing any 
dispositions or potentialities. 
A common response to such reductionist strategies is that condi-
tional analyses are false. One initial problem for a conditional analy-
sis is trying to accurately specify the appropriate conditional. A few 
moments of reflection is enough to realize that “if you drop it, it will 
break” is a woefully inadequate and overly simplistic analysis of fra-
gility. Such a conditional will not be true of a fragile glass if you drop 
it a fraction of an inch, drop it onto a fluffy cushion, or drop it in a 
low gravity environment. Dropping is not even necessary for a frag-
ile glass to break—you can strike it where it sits. But if you strike it 
softly with a feather, it will not break. However, a very powerful blow 
could break even non-fragile things. In order to state a conditional that 
is true of a thing if and only if it is fragile, you would have to figure 
out the precise conditions under which fragile and only fragile things 
break—no easy task. 
If it is difficult to specifying the conditions under which fragility 
manifests, it seems virtually impossible to specify in detail the circum-
stances of manifestation for certain potentialities like potential for in-
telligence. If the view is that something has a certain potential if and 
only if a certain conditional is true, then it is fair to expect to be told 
what that conditional statement is. But, in order to say what that· con-
ditional statement is, one would have to articulate the precise condi-
tions which are sufficient for a thing to realize its potential. It would 
be inadvisable to make them too precise, lest you deny that potential-
ity to other things which may aptly be said to have it. 
Even if you figure out the right conditional, a conditional analysis 
is still challenged by a number of counterexamples. One such coun-
terexample is a “mask” (Johnston 1992) or “antidote” (Bird 1998) 
which challenges the necessity of the analysis. For example, imag-
ine a fragile glass that is packed so that it has internal supports to 
prevent the glass from warping and therefore from shattering when 
struck. If you struck the packed glass, it would not shatter. The dis-
position ascription (A) is true-the glass is fragile-but the conditional 
claim (B) is false. 
Surely, a thing’s potentiality can be masked as well. An acorn could 
be placed in fertile soil, but if it were coated in hard plastic, the seed 
could not break through and grow. In that case, the acorn might 
still have the potential (Al to become an oak tree, but the associated 
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conditional (B l is false. The general problem is that, even if the speci-
fication of the circumstances of manifestation articulates all that must 
be present in order for the thing to realize its potential, the specifi-
cation cannot rule out all of the possible factors which may interfere. 
To add to the analysis “and nothing interferes” would trivialize it. It 
would be a matter of explicating “x has the potential to be F” as “x 
will become F, unless it does not.” 
One counterexample to the sufficiency of a conditional analysis of 
dispositions is the case of so-called “mimics” (Smith 1977). A mimic 
is something that lacks a certain disposition, but for idiosyncratic rea-
sons, acts as if it does. Odd circumstances result in a certain condi-
tional being true of something that nevertheless fails to instantiate 
the requisite disposition. Smith’s example is a wooden block that is 
brought to Neptune, where something about the atmosphere results 
in the block shattering when it is dropped. The conditional (B) “if you 
had dropped it, it would have broken” is true of the block on Neptune, 
but intuitively, the corresponding disposition ascription (A) is false; 
the block is not fragile. 
Interestingly, some of the most talked-about counterexamples to the 
moral relevance of potentiality appear to be variations on mimicking 
cases. Consider “super kitten,” a kitten which intuitively does not have 
the potential to be a person, but which could be injected with a spe-
cial serum that would tum it into something with the characteristics 
of a person (Tooley 1972). A kitten receiving such extraordinary treat-
ment is perhaps analogous to a wooden block being taken to Neptune, 
in the sense that, in both cases, unusual circumstances could lead to 
unusual results, and this challenges our application of the concepts in 
normal circumstances. In that case, the potentiality ascription (A)P is 
false, but the associated conditional (B)P turns out to be true. 
Another purported counterexample to the conditional analysis is 
the case of so-called “finkish” dispositions (Martin 1994; Lewis 1997). 
Once we note that things can acquire or lose dispositions, we can gen-
erate counterexamples to a conditional analysis by supposing that 
these gains and losses can occur when the circumstances of mani-
festation occurs. An example of a finkish disposition is the fragility 
of a glass which is protected by a wizard who will immediately ren-
der it non-fragile if it is ever struck. A less fantastical example of 
a finkish disposition is the instability of the DNA molecule. DNA is 
susceptible to breaking up due to forces, such as radiation and heat. 
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However, forces which would break the molecule also trigger mecha-
nisms within the cell nucleus that maintain the molecule’s structure 
(Tornaletti and Pfeiffer 1996). An object has a “finkish disposition” if 
that object has a disposition which it loses in what would otherwise 
be the circumstances of manifestation. If the disposition D is finkish, 
the same C that would normally cause x to exhibit M instead causes x 
to lose D before it can exhibit M. In this case, (A) is true: x does have 
the disposition. But (B) is false: If x were subject to C, it would not 
exhibit M. So, the analysis fails to state a necessary condition for x’s 
having a disposition. 
A potentiality could also be finkish. Consider again an acorn with 
the potential to become an oak tree. The circumstances of manifes-
tation of that potentiality include dropping onto fertile soil. But sup-
pose the gardener does not want any more oak trees in the yard, so 
he crushes any acorn that drops. The circumstances that would nor-
mally result in an acorn manifesting its potential lead to its destruc-
tion. If the acorn has the potential to be an oak tree, that is a case in 
which the potentiality claim (A)P is true, but the associated condi-
tional (B)P is false. 
A similar type of counterexample is called “altering” (Johnston 
1992). A glass swan is fragile, but a vigilant monitor equipped with 
a laser beam will rapidly melt the swan the moment it is struck. The 
conditional (B) is false, but the swan is fragile (A). Another example 
is the shy, but intuitive chameleon (Johnston 1992). The chameleon is 
green and thus disposed to look green, but before anyone can tum on 
the light and look at it, it blushes red. In both these cases, the condi-
tions of manifestation are such that, if they were realized, the object 
would “alter” and lose its disposition. 
A thing can also finkishly lack a disposition. When green, the cha-
meleon does not have the disposition to appear red, but when the cir-
cumstances of manifestation occur, the chameleon acquires that dis-
position. In this case, an object x which does not have disposition D 
gains D when exposed to circumstance C. and subsequently exhibits 
manifestation M. Arguably, prior to C occurring, (A) is false: x does 
not have the disposition. However, (B) is true: if x were to be subject 
to C, x would exhibit M. So, this kind of case also shows that the anal-
ysis fails to state a sufficient condition for x’s having a disposition. 
Something could finkishly lack a potentiality as well. If some clon-
ing or nanotechnology could tum something non-human into a human 
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fetus, and if that procedure is initiated only if that something is placed 
in a uterus, then that thing would, at the outset, lack the potential to 
be a human being. However, if it gets placed in the circumstances of 
manifestation, it would acquire that potential. Again, the potentiality 
claim (A)P would be false, but the associated conditional (B)P would 
be true. I suppose the super-kitten could be recast as something that 
finkishly lacks the potential to be a person, if those who would pro-
vide the transformative agent would do so only on the condition that 
the kitten gets adopted by a family that intends to raise it as a human 
child, teaching to it speak and so on. It would be true of the kitten “if 
it is nurtured and educated, it will become a person,” even though we 
may be disinclined to say that the kitten has the potential to become 
a person. 
2.1.2 The Revised Conditional Analysis 
Lewis’ revised conditional analysis (RCA) was specifically designed to 
overcome finks. Recall the simplified version of Lewis’ analysis states: 
x has a disposition at time t to give M in C iff x has intrin-
sic property P, and if x were to be in C at time t and retain P, 
then P and C would cause M (1997: 157). 
According to RCA, the activating conditions and an intrinsic prop-
erty of the disposed object jointly cause the manifestation of a dispo-
sition. In a finkish case, something causes the object to lose the rele-
vant intrinsic property, and subsequently to lose the disposition. The 
condition that the object retains the intrinsic property is not satisfied 
by objects with finkish dispositions, and so they pose no counterex-
ample to RCA. The condition that the object must have the intrinsic 
property is not met when something finkishly lacks a disposition, so 
that counterexample is defeated as well. 
While Lewis’ analysis does address cases of finks, it can be con-
tested on at least three grounds: (1) It assumes that all dispositions 
have causal bases; (2) It does not address the masking counterexam-
ples: and (3) it assumes that dispositions are intrinsic properties. 
I have argued elsewhere that dispositions do not necessarily have 
causal bases; there can be ungrounded or ‘bare’ dispositions (2003b). 
RCA fails to extend to such dispositions. I argue that it neither follows 
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from the concept of a disposition nor from the idea that disposition 
claims must have truth makers, that dispositions necessarily have 
causal bases. Others such as Molnar (2003) and Mumford (2005) at-
tempt to identify a class of ungrounded dispositions in the fundamen-
tal properties of subatomic particles. While it is reasonable to think 
that many of the potentialities I have been talking about (the potential 
to be a tree, a person, or a philosopher) are grounded, perhaps funda-
mental particles have potentialities, and these lack causal bases. Mol-
nar argues that the nature of these particles is exhausted by their dis-
positionality, and extensive experimentation has revealed no deeper 
structure to serve as the intrinsic properties to ground these dispo-
sitions (2003: 131-132). RCA would seem, therefore, to be inapplica-
ble to the most fundamental properties of the physical world. Other 
second-order property accounts can be rejected for similar reasons. 
In addition, it is acknowledged that RCA still faces the problem of 
masking. Consider the glass that is carefully packed. According to RCA, 
to say the glass is fragile is to say that it has some intrinsic property 
P, and if it were to be in circumstances of striking at time t and retain 
P, then P and striking would cause breaking. However, the carefully 
packed glass retains its intrinsic properties, but its intrinsic proper-
ties and the striking do not cause the glass to break.  
As I have also argued elsewhere, dispositions are not necessarily 
intrinsic to the objects that have them (McKitrick 2003a). A property 
is extrinsic if perfect intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to 
having it.7 Contrary to Lewis, perfect duplicates could differ with re-
spect to having certain dispositions; a thing can lose or acquire dis-
positions without changing intrinsically. Weight may be dispositional, 
but it is not intrinsic. The weight of an object is relative to its gravi-
tational field. According to RCA, weight could be defined as follows: 
An object weighs one hundred pounds (it has a disposition 
at time t to exhibit the reading “100 lbs.” in circumstances of 
standing on a standard scale) if and only if it has an intrin-
sic property P, and if it were to stand on a standard scale at 
t and retain P. then P and standing on the scale would cause 
it to exhibit the reading “100 lbs.” 
7. This is not a reductive analysis of “extrinsic” but is offered as a heuristic, intuitive guide 
to judgments about extrinsicality.
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But if the object stood on the scale on the moon at t, its intrin-
sic properties plus standing on a scale would not cause a “100 lbs.” 
reading. 
Extrinsic Potentialities 
As with looking for examples of extrinsic dispositions, the strategy for 
finding cases of extrinsic potentialities is to consider perfect intrin-
sic duplicates and see if they could differ with respect to potential-
ity attributions. So, consider an acorn with the potentiality for “tree-
hood” and a perfect duplicate of that acorn in a different world, all by 
itself. This acorn is “lonely” in the sense that it is the only object in 
its world. If the lonely acorn lacks the potentiality for treehood, then 
that potentiality is extrinsic. So, does the lonely acorn have the poten-
tiality for treehood? If the circumstances of manifestation must occur 
somewhere in that world in order to have the potentiality, then the 
lonely acorn lacks the potentiality. The lonely acorn can also lack the 
potential for treehood if it is in a world where the laws of nature pro-
hibit any circumstance which would enable it to develop into a tree. 
However, some philosophers think that the relevant sense in which 
dispositions are intrinsic is that they are “intrinsic, keeping the laws 
of nature fixed” (Lewis 1997). An interesting and relevant question, 
at any rate, is whether duplicates in the same kinds of worlds, or dif-
ferent parts of the same world, could differ with respect to a poten-
tiality. It would be helpful here to consider end of life cases, where 
one makes claims such as: a coma victim is potentially conscious, or 
a terminal condition is potentially reversible. A patient might not be 
capable of recovering or becoming conscious, given current medical 
technology. However, it is possible that some future medical technol-
ogy could reverse his condition. Do we want to say that the patient 
currently has the potential to recover? That seems misleading at best. 
Perhaps it would be more correct to say that they are not now poten-
tially conscious, but if extrinsic factors were different, they would 
be. Then the patient’s potential for recovery is an extrinsic poten-
tiality. It is plausible that similar considerations apply if the neces-
sary medical technologies exist, but are not practically accessible, if 
they are very far away or prohibitively expensive, for example. Two 
patients with the same condition could have different potentialities 
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due to the differing circumstances, and this entails that those poten-
tialities are extrinsic. 
Similar considerations apply in beginning of life cases. Perfect 
duplicate embryos in different circumstances could have different 
potentialities. For instance, consider an embryo outside of a uterus 
and its perfect duplicate inside of a uterus. If there are no avail-
able means for implanting the embryo into a favorable environment, 
then by parity of reasoning with the end of life cases, we should say 
that the embryo lacks the potentialities enjoyed by its duplicate in-
side of a uterus. Therefore, the embryo’s potentiality for rationality 
is an extrinsic potentiality, Another thing to consider is what counts 
as “available means” for implanting an embryo. Surely, the medical 
technology must exist in this case, too. So, if we consider two du-
plicate frozen embryos, one in a fertility clinic with all the staff and 
equipment necessary for successful implantation, and the other in a 
remote location with no such amenities, perhaps we should say that 
those embryos have different potentialities. And if perfect duplicates 
can differ with respect to having a certain potentiality, then that po-
tentiality is extrinsic. 
Typically, those that think that causal bases are essential to dispo-
sitions are thinking of those causal bases as intrinsic (Lewis 1997). 
However, an alternative position is that not only can dispositions be 
extrinsic, but the causal bases of dispositions can be extrinsic too (No-
lan 2005). So, the mistake of those that claim that intrinsic duplicates 
have the same disposition is not that they are only focusing on the 
causal basis of that disposition, but rather that they are only focusing 
on part of the causal basis of the disposition, and not taking into ac-
count the properties that are extrinsic to the disposed individual that 
are part of the causal basis of its disposition. In other words, if an em-
bryo’s potentiality is extrinsic, then the causal basis of its potential-
ity does not merely consist of the intrinsic properties of the embryo, 
but also includes properties of its environment. 
One may argue that, if potentialities can be extrinsic properties, 
that is all the worse for realism about potentialities. Extrinsic proper-
ties are the quintessential “Cambridge properties,” the properties that 
things acquire when they undergo “Cambridge changes,” which are 
not genuine changes (Geach 1969; Shoemaker 1980). However, pro-
ponents of such a view are committed to rejecting all extrinsic prop-
erties and relations, including being married, being taller, happening 
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later, and standing a meter away. Perhaps some relational proper-
ties can be reductively explained in terms of intrinsic properties, but 
reducing all spatial and temporal properties to intrinsic properties 
promises to be problematic. 
Taking stock of where we are, the above argument for extrinsic po-
tentialities is presented for the purposes of resisting attempts to re-
duce disposition claims to conditional claims about intrinsic non-dis-
positional properties. Ungrounded dispositions and masks are also 
outstanding problems for such attempts. At this point, aspiring re-
ductionists may want to look elsewhere.  
2.1.3 Reduction by Other Accounts 
Views according to which dispositions are irreducible powers cannot 
be used to reduce potentialities away. If such views are correct, and 
if potentialities just are (a type of) disposition, then potentialities are 
irreducible too. Second-order property accounts will not do the job 
either. (Recall that a second-order property account is one according 
to which “x has a disposition D to exhibit M in C iff x has some prop-
erty P which is a causal basis for giving M in C.”) As mentioned above, 
a second-order property account assumes that all dispositions have 
causal bases, a claim which has been contested. But even if we grant 
that potentialities have causal bases, this second-order property ac-
count is not sufficiently reductive. The causal basis is characterized 
as a property that “would be causally efficacious for M in C”-it would 
cause the disposition’s manifestation in the circumstances of manifes-
tation. In other words, what makes a property a causal basis of a dis-
position is its power to have a certain effect. But that is tantamount 
to saying that the causal basis is or has a dispositional property. Lack-
ing some reductive account of what it means to say that a property is 
such that “would cause” a certain effect, a second-order property ac-
count seems to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of having dis-
positional properties. 
Another account to consider is Manely and Wasserman’s PROP. Re-
call that PROP says “x is disposed to M when C iff x would M in a suit-
able proportion of C-cases”-where C-cases are possible circumstances. 
It matters not that some C-cases include finks or masks, as long as 
enough of the C-cases are cases where x M’s. Also, it does not mat-
ter if there are some mimics; if some y is not disposed to Min C, but 
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nevertheless M’s in some particular circumstances. Presumably, if we 
are still disinclined to say that y is disposed to M in C, that is because 
there are still too many relevant possible situations in which y does 
not M in C. Nor does it matter if the disposition is extrinsic or un-
grounded, since the analysans makes no mention of bases, intrinsic 
or otherwise. So, it seems that we have an analysis that steers clear 
of many of the pitfalls that plagued other conditional analyses. Does 
this mean we can make sense of all our disposition and potentiality 
talk, while denying the existence of dispositions and potentialities? 
One response is that PROP cannot deal with all of the counterex-
amples, particularly those that have come to be known as intrinsic 
finks (Ashwell 2010; Clarke 2008; Everett 2009). Johnston’s shy-but-
intuitive-chameleon example is one of an intrinsic fink. It is disposed 
to look green, but due to its intrinsic properties, it loses that dispo-
sition when people look at it. Given that description, it will not look 
green in the majority of the C-cases. This disposition claim “x is dis-
posed to M when C” is (arguably) true, but the associated conditional 
“x would M in a suitable proportion of C-cases” is false in the case of 
this chameleon. 
Another response is to say that this conditional analysis is neither 
here nor there with respect to the reality of potentialities. A condi-
tional analysis of potentialities says something about what we mean 
when we say something has a potentiality. One may argue that it 
places no restrictions on our metaphysical views about the  existence 
of such properties. In fact, Manley and Wasserman do not claim that 
PROP reduces disposition ascriptions to conditionals. They write: 
We take PROP to capture a necessary connection between 
dispositions and conditionals, but we withhold judgment on 
the priority of either side of this equation (whether meta-
physical or conceptual) (2011: 4). 
To say that something has a potentiality if and only if a certain con-
ditional is true of it does not go to show that there are no potentiali-
ties any more than it goes to show that there are no true conditional 
propositions. On abundant (non-sparse) views of properties, a thing 
can have the property of being such that a certain conditional is true of 
it. On an extensional view of properties, for example, the set of things 
that a certain conditional is true of constitutes a property. Or perhaps 
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the reason why certain conditionals are true of a thing is because it 
has certain potentialities. In that case, the order of dependence goes 
in the other direction. In sum, anti-realism about potentialities has not 
been established by reductive analyses of potentiality claims. 
2.1.4 Subjectivism 
Another argument that one could level against realism about poten-
tialities begins with the idea that potentiality claims say more about 
subjective human psychology than they do about any mind-indepen-
dent properties. Recall some of the questions considered above: Is 
super-kitten a potential person? If some therapy might be developed 
in the future which would save someone’s life were it to exist now, 
does that patient have the potential to recover now? Whether we an-
swer “yes” or “no,” it may be asked, on what basis do we determine 
our answer? Perhaps what determines our answers is our own crite-
ria of plausibility or estimation of future possibilities. We could model 
a person’s thinking when making potentiality judgments as follows: 
Consider some object and some relevant sample of its possible future 
stages; then arrange those future possibilities in order of your esti-
mation of their likelihood; then, pick a threshold beyond which the 
possible outcome is one which you consider too unlikely to take seri-
ously. Every future state below that threshold is one which the object 
has a potentiality for. 
For example, consider the acorn. Possible future states might in-
clude getting crushed, becoming an oak tree, becoming a table, and be-
coming a chicken. Depending on your bounds of plausibility, you might 
say that the acorn has the potential to become an oak tree, but not a 
table or a chicken. But others may have different orderings of likeli-
hood, and put the threshold in a different place, and so make differ-
ent judgments as to a thing’s potentialities. In this regard, something 
having a potentiality is like it being something that inspires expecta-
tion, hope, or dread-all descriptions of a thing in terms of the psycho-
logical states of observers.  If this is the right way to understand our 
potentiality talk, then whether a thing has a certain potentiality will 
be relative to individuals, based on their subjective probabilities and 
standards of plausibility.8
8. Thanks to Matthew McKitrick for suggesting this line of argument.
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This would, in effect, be another reductionist strategy. It amounts 
to saying that if a potentiality claim is true, it is because of the psy-
chological states of the person making it, and not because of the ex-
istence of any property possessed by the object that they are mak-
ing the claim about. One can find inspiration for such an argument 
in Hume, who famously locates the origin of the idea of causation in 
a feeling of expectation, as well as more recent theories that regard 
causal claims as implicitly contrastive or value-laden (Hume 1978; 
Maslen 2004; Kagan 1988). If whether ‘A caused B’ depends on expec-
tations, salience of contrast classes, or moral judgments, and these 
things differ from person to person, causal powers, and by implica-
tion potentialities, cannot be regarded as objective, mind-indepen-
dent properties. 
To respond to such an anti-realist argument, note an implication of 
the view being suggested. If my claim that something has a potential-
ity is merely a report about my subjective probabilities, then as long 
as my words accurately reflect my psychological state, I cannot be mis-
taken. If it seems to me that being a chicken is a possible future state 
of an acorn, and I do not regard that possibility as too far out, then 
when I say “an acorn is a potential chicken,” I am saying something 
true. But it seems that people can disagree about what potentialities 
things have, and that they are not merely talking past each other, each 
reporting on their own subjective probabilities. 
Another consideration to keep in mind is the distinction between 
epistemic potentiality and metaphysical potentiality. Recall that when 
one thinks that some claim has some chance of being true, one may 
express that idea by saying “it is potentially true.” However, that is 
not necessarily to attribute a potentiality to anything. The idea that 
attributing a potentiality to something is a report of one’s subjective 
probability treats all potentiality claims as if they were about epis-
temic potentiality. But it is not clear that this is so. It is worth point-
ing out the analogy to chance. Many claims about the chance of some 
event occurring can be appropriately interpreted as claims about sub-
jective probability, based on one’s epistemic situation. This can, of 
course, deviate from the objective chance of the event occurring. If 
I flip a fair coin once and conceal the outcome from you, from your 
point of view, it has a 50% chance of being heads up, but in terms of 
objective probability, once the flip is over, it either has a 0% or 100% 
chance of being heads up. 
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Just as we can interpret “chance-talk” as being about subjective 
probability, objective probability, or some mixture of the two, so we 
can understand “potentiality-talk” as sometimes epistemic, sometimes 
metaphysical, and sometimes a mixture. In other words, if! say “x is 
potentially F” I might mean: “For all I know, x is F”; “There are cir-
cumstances in which x can become F”; or “For all I know, there are 
circumstances in which x can become F.” Where the threshold of plau-
sibility judgment comes in is how to interpret the “there are circum-
stances” Part of the metaphysical claim. What does it take for it to be 
true that “there are circumstances in which x can become F”? 
For example, in order for a fetus to be potentially rational, there 
must be circumstances in which it would become rational. But in what 
sense is it the case that “there are” such circumstances? Since it is 
possible to possess this potential without manifesting it, it cannot be 
the case that these circumstances must actually obtain for the par-
ticular embryo to be potentially rational. However, saying that there 
are such circumstances, as long as such circumstances are logically 
or metaphysically possible, would allow too many things to count as 
potentially rational. Even given a metaphysically possible scenario in 
which rocks are turned into rational beings, we want to say embryos 
are potentially rational in the actual world while rocks are not. So, 
the circumstances which enable an embryo to become rational must 
be at least physically possible. We might want to place more restric-
tions on the range of possible circumstances and say that they must 
not only be possible in this world, but that circumstances of this kind 
are instantiated somewhere in this world, or that they are not too re-
mote or unlikely to obtain. 
I think that ordinary uses of “potential” underdetermine how to 
proceed here. If a philosopher wants to employ a more technical con-
cept, “potentiality,” it would behoove her to clarify what range of pos-
sible circumstances are relevant to her potentiality attributions. Given 
a clarification of the concept, I see no reason to think that whether 
such a concept applies to a thing is merely a subjective matter. 
2.2 The Eleatic Principle and the Inert Dispositions Thesis 
Another possible reason for thinking that potentialities are not real 
is the belief that potentialities run afoul of the Eleatic Principle-to be 
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real is to have causal powers. On the face of it, this seems strange: If 
potentialities are dispositions and dispositions are powers, who would 
think that powers are powerless? But proponents of such arguments 
are not thinking of dispositions as irreducible powers, but are typi-
cally thinking of them as second-order properties (Prior et al. 1982; 
Jackson 1995, 1996; Block 1990; Kim 1993; Rives 2005). If having a 
disposition is a matter of having some other property, then arguably 
dispositions are derivative and causally irrelevant. If this “inert dispo-
sitions thesis” and the Eleatic Principle are correct, dispositions, and 
by implication, potentialities, are not real. 
Two common strategies supporting the Inert Dispositions The-
sis are analyticity arguments and exclusion arguments. According 
to analyticity arguments, there is an analytic or necessary connec-
tion between a disposition and its manifestation, and this goes to 
show that there is no causal connection. According to exclusion argu-
ments, manifestations of dispositions already have sufficient causes, 
and this excludes dispositions from playing any causal role. How-
ever, as I will explain in this section, these arguments do not suc-
ceed (McKitrick 2004). 
I have already raised some problems for second-order property ap-
proaches to reductively analyzing dispositions. But though I argue that 
some dispositions are ungrounded, I have left open the possibility that 
others have causal bases, so the causal relevance and thus the onto-
logical status of those properties is challenged by these arguments. 
By the same token, I would be concerned to reply to dispositional re-
alists who claim, for similar reasons, that only fundamental powers 
are genuine (Bird 2007; Molnar 2003: 27). 
2.2.1 Analyticity Arguments 
According to an analyticity argument, there is an analytic relation 
between a disposition and a manifestation, and this is evidence that 
there is no causal connection between them. Any adequate definition 
of a disposition will refer to its characteristic manifestation. For ex-
ample, “fragility” is defined by reference to breaking or shattering. 
So, there is a definitional, conceptual, or logical connection between a 
disposition term and an event-type-between ‘fragility’ and breaking, 
for example. “Fragile objects tend to break when struck” is analytic (if 
anything is). It is further assumed that causal claims are contingent, 
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and therefore not analytic. It follows that, if a statement is analytic, it 
is not a causal statement. Consequently, “The glass broke because it 
was fragile” cannot be a causal claim, and so fragility must be caus-
ally inert. By the same reasoning, a potentiality is not the cause of its 
actualization; the acorn’s potential to become a tree is not a cause of 
it becoming a tree. 
Such analyticity arguments have long been disputed (Davidson 
1980: 14). Causal connections between events hold independently of 
our descriptions of them. If “the cause of e caused e” is analytic, that 
does not go to show that the cause of e did not cause e. A similar point 
can be made in terms of properties. The analyticity of the claim “The 
property that was causally efficacious for e was causally efficacious 
for e” should not lead us to think that the property that was causally 
efficacious for e was not causally efficacious for e. 
According to more modest versions of an analyticity argument, 
our sense that the disposition is relevant to the manifestation is ex-
plained by an analytic connection, and this leaves us with no reason 
to suppose a causal connection holds as well. This is what Block sug-
gests when he writes: 
The fact that dormitivity is sufficient for sleep is perfectly 
intelligible in terms of this logical relation. What reason is 
there to suppose that there must also be a nomological rela-
tion between dormitivity and sleep? (1990: 157). 
The quick answer to Block’s rhetorical question is that our language 
can track causal connections. Examples of this are familiar: sunburn 
is caused by excessive exposure to sunlight; lethal injections and fa-
tal accidents cause death. 
A related argument for the Inert Dispositions Thesis appeals to 
Hume’s Principle that there are no necessary connections between 
distinct existences. According to Frank Jackson, to allow that fragility 
causes breaking upon dropping  
would be to allow that there are properties that have causal 
powers essentially: in every world the property of having the 
property or properties responsible for breaking on dropping 
in that world is possessed only by objects which are such that 
were they dropped they would break. There is no way that 
J.  McKitr ick  in  Handbo ok  of  P otential ity  (2018)       37
the second-order property can be instantiated without the 
relevant causal power being instantiated. So, if we are to re-
spect Hume’s insight, we must deny that fragility itself does 
the causing of the breaking ... (1995: 257). 
To assess this argument, one should first consider what it means 
to “respect Hume’s insight.” As I interpret Hume, his argument 
against necessary connections between distinct existences goes as 
follows: 
(1) If one can conceive of A without B, then there is no necessary 
connection between A and B. 
(2) For any distinct existences A and B, one can always conceive 
of A without B. 
(3) Therefore, there are no necessary connections between dis-
tinct existences (1978: 79). 
If you were to discover two distinct existences which are such that 
you cannot conceive one without the other, that would be a counter-
example to premise (2). But perhaps Jackson takes himself to have 
conceived of a case of a necessary connection between distinct ex-
istences-the one which would obtain if fragility had the power to 
cause breaking. But instead of taking this as a counter-example to 
Hume’s Principle, he assumes the principle in a modus tollens argu-
ment against the possibility he has conceived. Jackson’s argument can 
be put like this: 
i. There are no necessary connections between distinct 
existences. 
ii. ‘Fragility’ and ‘the power to cause breaking’ are distinct 
existences. 
iii. If fragility had the power to cause breaking, there would be 
a necessary connection between ‘fragility’ and ‘the power to 
cause breaking.’ 
iv. Therefore, fragility does not have the power to cause breaking. 
Jackson, then, faces a dilemma with respect to Hume’s argument 
above. Either Jackson cannot conceive of ‘fragility’ without ‘the power 
to cause breaking,’ thus contradicting Hume’s premise (2), or he can 
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conceive of ‘fragility’ without ‘the power to cause breaking,’ and given 
Hume’s premise (1), there is no necessary connection between ‘fra-
gility’ and ‘the power to cause breaking,’ contradicting Jackson’s own 
premise (iii). The two arguments are not mutually consistent. In short, 
Jackson employs Hume’s Principle in an argument which is inconsis-
tent with Hume’s own argument for the principle, and Jackson gives 
us no independent reason to accept it. 
Even if we accept Hume’s Principle on other grounds, in order for 
dispositional properties with causal powers to run afoul of it, a dis-
position and its causal power must be distinct existences. But it is not 
clear that a thing’s fragility and its power to cause breaking are dis-
tinct existences. Furthermore, even if this argument shows that ‘fra-
gility’ is not causally relevant to breaking, there is another disposi-
tion mentioned in the argument, namely ‘the power to cause breaking,’ 
whose causal relevance is never doubted. So, even if Jackson’s argu-
ment is successful against fragility, it does not stand as an argument 
against causally relevant dispositions generally. 
In sum, neither the straightforward Analyticity Argument, nor Jack-
son’s appeal to Hume’s Principle, succeed in showing that dispositions 
are causally inert or unreal. Now, let us tum to a different argumenta-
tive strategy for the Inert Dispositions Thesis—exclusion arguments. 
2.2.2 Exclusion Arguments 
Exclusion arguments are familiar in the literature on mental causa-
tion. Consider mental property M and physical property P, which are 
candidates for being causally efficacious with respect to a brain event 
with mental property M* and physical property P*. Jaegwon Kim ar-
gues that M has no causal powers of its own: 
P is doing all the causal work. and M’s causation of P*, or of M* 
turns out to be derivative from P’s causal powers. Thus. M has 
no causal powers over and beyond those of P ... (1993: 353). 
Similarly, Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (hereafter PPJ) support the 
Inert Dispositions Thesis with an exclusion argument. They write 
that since the causal basis and the circumstances of manifestation 
are sufficient for the manifestation, “there is nothing left for any other 
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properties of the object to do” (1982: 255). These exclusion arguments 
target second-order properties generally. It is claimed that the base 
properties are causally efficacious for a certain event, and this ex-
cludes the second-order property from being causally efficacious as 
well. If the circumstances of manifestation and the base properties 
are sufficient for the manifestation, then it is thought that all other 
properties must be inert. 
PPJ’s (1982: 255) argument is typical. It can be summarized as 
follows: 
a. The Causal Thesis: Every disposition has a causal basis. 
b. The Distinctness Thesis: Causal bases are distinct from their 
attendant dispositions. 
c. When a disposition’s manifestation occurs, its causal basis and 
its circumstances of manifestation are its jointly sufficient 
causes. 
d. The Exclusion Principle: If the instantiation of a set of proper-
ties is sufficient to cause an effect, then all other properties 
are causally inefficacious with respect to that effect. 
Therefore, 
e. Dispositions are causally inefficacious. 
Suppose a particular causal basis for a potentiality and the prop-
erties of the circumstances of manifestation are sufficient for the 
manifestation. It would follow from the Exclusion Principle that the 
potentiality is causally irrelevant, and by the Eleatic Principle, the po-
tentiality is not real. 
In support of the Exclusion Principle, Kim says “The general prin-
ciple of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and 
independent explanations of the same phenomenon cannot coexist” 
(1993: 250). PPJ succinctly echo “a complete causal explanation ex-
cludes competitors” (1982: 255). Proponents of the Exclusion Prin-
ciple say that to deny it is to allow for spurious overdetermination. 
Denying the Exclusion Principle amounts to saying that both a poten-
tiality and its causal basis are each sufficient for the effect, given the 
circumstances of manifestation. If this happened every time a poten-
tiality was actualized, we would have, as Block says, “bizarre, system-
atic over-determination” (1990: 159). 
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Standardly, an event e is causally overdetermined if two or more 
distinct events occur, each of which is sufficient to cause e. Perhaps 
there is something wrong with postulating too many coincidences. 
And if a great many effects systematically had two distinct events 
that were sufficient for causing them, that would run counter to 
our understanding of the causal structure of the world. Maybe that 
would be too high a price to pay for real potentialities. However, one 
should not overlook the fact that these considerations and intuitions 
about overdetermination apply to two (or more) events overdeter-
mining an effect. But what we are concerned with in the case of po-
tentialities and causal bases are the properties of a single individ-
ual. It is not clear what it means to say an effect is overdetermined 
by an object’s properties. 
The Exclusion Principle asks us to single out one special set of prop-
erties that are minimally sufficient for an effect, and declare the rest 
causally inert. This may prove difficult to do, especially when prop-
erties are so intimately related, as a potentiality is to its causal ba-
sis. Furthermore, it is not clear that we have any compelling reason 
to suppose that, for any effect, there is only one minimally sufficient 
set of causally efficacious properties. Consider the following proposi-
tions: The cape has surface reflectance property R; the cape is red21 
; the cape is crimson; the cape is red; the cape is colored (Yablo 1992: 
257). Now, suppose that each proposition entails its successor. It fol-
lows from the Exclusion Principle that, if one of the above properties 
is causally efficacious for a certain effect, all of the others are caus-
ally inert with respect to that effect. However, it seems reasonable to 
think, as Funkhouser claims: “Instances of determinables and their 
determinates do not causally exclude each other” (2006: 3). If that is 
not right, it is not clear what would determine the level of specificity 
at which the causal action is going on. One might argue, as Kim does 
at times, that all of the causal action happens at the most fundamen-
tal level (1993). Such an assumption has serious counter-intuitive con-
sequences, for example, that all of the macro-properties we regularly 
observe are causally impotent. Furthermore, assuming that all causal 
action happens at the level of fundamental properties may not serve 
the Inert Dispositions Thesis, since it seems likely that fundamental 
properties are dispositional.  
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3 Conclusion 
I have argued that potentialities are properties, specifically disposi-
tions. Metaphysical accounts of properties and of dispositions pro-
vide resources for a variety of views about the nature of potential-
ities, according to which some potentialities are genuine, real, and 
existent. An anti-realist might argue that potentiality claims reduce 
to claims about other sorts of entities, or that potentialities cannot 
be real because they have no causal powers. I have defended realism 
about potentialities by countering reductionism and the Inert Dispo-
sitions Thesis. 
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